1] advocate the use of Dempster-Shafer (0-5) theory in evidence-gathering process.
INTRODUCTION
Providing a framework for evidential reasoning in an AI system has become an important task. In a recent publication, "A Method of Managing Evidential Reasoning in a Hierarchical Hypothesis Space" [1] , Gordon and Shonliffe (G-S) advocate the use of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theol}' in evidence-gathering process. They adapt the D-S theory to evidential reasoning in a tree-structured hierarchy of hypotheses. It is stated Ihat they are unaware of any formal model which could allow inexact reasoning at whatever level of abstraction. Pearl [2] later shows how evidential reasoning can be conducted in Ihe same hypol.hesis space using a Bayesian model. The purpose of this note is to examine the difference of lhese two approaches, and to point out certain inconsistencies of this Bayesian model with the motives behind the use of D-S model.
THE DOMAIN
Suppose an expert is diagnosing a case X. The diagnostic hypolhesis set H = {h I ' ...• hn } are known to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Any subset of hypothesis in H gives rise 10 a new hypothesis which is assumed to be of semantic interest The diagram can be viewed as a n-Iayer graph. with H as the root on the top layer and the individual hypotheses as the leaves in the nth layer and each intennediate nodes stands for the disjunction of its immediate successors. For illustrative purposes. Figure 1 shows the graph corresponding
Although [lJ [2] both constrain the graph into a tree, it is clear later that this setting would be more convenient for the purpose of comparison without the necessity of introducing additional approximation step. In [2] , the 3-srep evidence aggregation technique is apparently not restricted to a tree-structured hierarchy of hypothesis. In [I], discussions of the Dempster-Shafer lheory are in fact based on a layer graph instead of a tree. The purpose of restricting a graph into a tree is for computational pwposes where G-S has to introduce approximation steps for the D-S theory to overcome the combinational computation.
Several motives which have led G~S to advocate the use of the Dempster-Shafer theory are listed below:
(i) Evidence partially in favor of a hypolhesis should not be construed as evidence partially against the same hypothesis (Le. in favor of its negation).
(ii) Model allows an inexact reasoning at whatever level of abstraction is appropriate for the evidence that has been gathered.
(iii) Ability to distinguish between uncertaintyI or lack of knowledge and equal certainty.
BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF BOTH SCHEMES

D-S Model
There are two functions in the D-S model: one is called bpa -basic probability assignment, another is called belief function. A bpa. denoted m. assigns a number in [0,1] to every node in the layer graph such that these numbers swn to 1. A belief function, denoted Bel, corresponding to a specific bpa, m, assigns to every node of the layer graph the sum of m -values of every descendant (including itself).
Example 1.
An expert may have a role knowledge:
Rl: Evidence e I, confirms hI to the degree 0. 
These two examples allow one to address whatever level of abstraction which is appropriate for the gathered evidence, and illustrate (ii) effectively. Examining RI, it says nothing about lhe
This captures (i) very well. Occasionally. it is hard to think why 0.2 in Rl gives no hint on the negation of h I. The following argument will be useful: Suppose a textbook says there are five pieces of evidence to characterize h I. However, the relationship of these five pieces of evidence with other hj i '#. 1 is complex and Dot clear. The expert who has read this textbook may give the knowledge engineer a rule that if a piece of evidence observed then confinns hI to the degree 0.2. Under this circumstance, he would be reluctant 10 tell the knowledge engineer anything more of other associations.
A Baysian Model
Initially, each singleton hypothesis hj is assigned a probability in [O.ll, denoting p. such " that L p(hj) = 1. These p(hj ) are suggested to reflect the probability that h j is true given all ;=1 previous evidence. The probability in each intennediate node is the sum afthe probability of its
where SC is the complement of S willi respect to H, e is a new piece of evidence. It is easy to see that
pte IS')· Therefore, a correct way would be Evidence e6 disconfirms that Dr. Short/iffe is not in his office to the degree 0.25. It is clear that "confirm" or "disconfirm" is used for convenience. One might as well use the term below Based on evidence e6. the degree oflhe belief that Dr. Short/iffe is in his office is 4.
It is apparent that evidence in favor of h is used to partially support the negation of h as opposed to what author [2] claims -that it would not be construed for other purposes. Although [2] claims that the expert is not required to apply any conscious effort whatsoever regarding other propositions in the system, the formula about A. s is actually used in the computational process to derive the updating scheme. If A. s were not equal to the inverse of As. then there will be inconsistency in the framework.
As for the motive (iii), this is one of the properties that a Bayesian model generally does not have. For instance, the situation that a piece of evidence provides equal certainty on S and SC I i.e As = 1 will be treated as if no evidence (or lack of evidence) at all in view of the updating scheme.
The Effect of Combining Two Rules
It is now for us to write down the belief updating scheme [2] The formula could be understood by examining one piece of evidence e I. which bears directly on S I and the degree afbelicf is A.t_ To update the probability, first one must multiply A.l to probability of every hypothesis in S 1 and keep the probabilities of other hypothesis the same.
Next. one has to nonnalize the sum of the probabilities to 1. The fonnula also says that one could delay the normalization.
We now discuss the effect of combining two rules. One notes that there is no need to obtain any apriori belief in each singleton hypothesis in D-S model as required in Baysian Model. As said in [1] , there are three categories when rules are applying to singleton hypothesis.
(1) they may boLh confirm or both disconfirm the same hypothesis, (2) one may confirm and the other may disconfirrn the same hypothesis,
(3) each may bring evidence to bear on different competing hypothesis. For D-S model, the combined effect is that one can replace Tl, 1'2 by a rule "confinns h I to the degree 8 I + 82 -81 82"· One observes that 81 + 82 -8 I 822: max(8t 8i), therefore it always increases the belief in h 1.
For Baysian Model, through simple computation, the combined effect is that Kl, K2 can be replaced by a rule •'belief in hI to the degree AI 'Jvz". In this category, Alo ' Jvz are both necessarily greater than 1, therefore the confirmation in h I is also strengthened as that in D-S model. However, the belief in other singleton hypothesis is necessarily reduced. 
For Baysian Model, the updates is as follows: p(hde) = a A,p(h l ) p(h,le) = a 'A.,p(hi) p(h,le)~a p(h,) p(h,le)=a p(h,)
where a = IA,p (h ,) + 'A.,p (hi) + 1 -P (h 1 U hi)r l One sees that a'!..,~A,p(h,) + 'A.,p(hi) + 1-p(h, u hi) > -"""7-'---;;-"""7::''1. result as below.
Thus. one can summarize the
Continuation in h 1 and disconfirmaLion in hz still holds. However, the degree of ., confirm and disconfinn" may get strengthened or weakened. The effect on other hypothesis may get increased or decreased.
CONCLUSION
With regard to computational aspect, this Bayesian model [2J has obviously provided a sim-pIe and convenient framework:. However. it is inconsistent wiLh some of the motives which have led G-S to advocate the use of D-S model. It is evident that each technique could find its proper domains but not used in the same domain.
